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ADmIRALTY-COURT CAN PROCEED TO FINAL DISPOSITION AFTER DENIAL
OF "LimuTED LIABiTY".-The petitioner-shipowner sought the aid of statutes
which limit a vessel owner's responsibility for loss incurred without his
"privity" or "knowledge" to his interest in the ship and her pending freight.
9 Stat. 635, (1851) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8021-28. The co-petitioner
was surety on the ad interim stipulation which guaranteed payment of the
statutory amount. The lower court denied the petition for "limited liability",
but retained the cause for proceedings to final settlement of all claims,
thereby requiring the surety to pay the sum stipulated into court. Held,
on appeal, that the decree be affirmed, since the final disposition was in-
cidental to the broad power given by Congress in these cases. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. So. Pac. Co., 47 Sup. Ct. 357 (U. S. 1927).
Limited liability statutes can be invoked only in the federal courts.
Charles Nelson Co. v. Curtis, 1 Fed. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924). And
the subject matter in dispute usually must have been originally cognizable
in admiralty. The Laforrest L. Simmons, 276 Fed. 61 (D. Mass. 1921).
But the statute has been interpreted to include non-maritime torts.
Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U. S. 96, 32 Sup. Ct. 27 (1911). The powers
of a court of admiralty in these proceedings are similar to those of a
court of equity. The Clarence P. Howland, 6 Fed. (2d) 791 (C. C. A. 2d,
1925) (future actions or those pending in state or federal courts enjoined) ;
The Benefactor, 103 U. S. 239 (1880) (execution on a judgment of another
court stayed); The St. Johns, 101 Fed. 469 (S. D. N. Y. 1900) (proceeds
distributed pro rata). The decree can be rendered against the ship, against
the owner, or against both. Place v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co., 118
U! S. 468, 6 Sup. Ct. 1150 (1886). And is res adjudicata. The Benefactor,
supra. But when the petition for relief is denied, the injunctions of pend-
ing suits are removed. Husateca Petrol. Co. v. Cia de Lloyd Brasilciro,
297 Fed. 318 (E. D. N. Y. 1924). Where there are no actions pending in
other courts it is contended that the admiralty court may not proceed to
a final settlement over the objection of a claimant because this would vio-
late the right of jury trial. See The Eureka, 108 Fed. 672, 674 (S. D.
N. Y. 1901); cf. the "saving clause", 1 Stat. 76, (1789) U. S. Comp. Stat.
(1916) § 991 (3). This objection is significant since all claimants are
obliged to enter the limitation proceedings or forfeit their claims. See
The San Pedro, 223 U. S. 365, 371, 32 Sup. Ct. 275, 276 (1913). On the
other hand the prevention of needless litigation, greater convenience, and the
saving of court costs might outweigh this contention. Cf. Benner Line v.
Penldeton, 217 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); Petition of Standard Oil Co.,
284 Fed. 526 (S. D. N. Y. 1922). Since the objecting surety was in the
position of a defendant in the final disposition of the suit, he would be in
no position to demand a jury trial under the "saving clause", supra.
AGENCY-ADOPTION BY PRINCIPAL OF CONTRACT UNDER SAL.-The plain-
tiff's agent signed and sealed in his principal's name a contract for a
lease to the defendant. The plaintiff added his signature of approval,
without seal, in the presence of the defendant, and delivered the contract
to the latter, who accepted it. The contract did not require a seal to be
operative. In a suit for failure to take possession, judgment was rendered
for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed, as, inter
alia, the agent had no sealed authority to make a contract under seal for
his principal. Featherston v.,Reese, 136 S. E. 811 (Ga. 1927).
An authorization under seal is necessary in Georgia to enable an agent to
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bind his principal l5y a sealed contract even though the contract would
ordinarily be operative without a seal. Unitcd Leatlicr Co. v,. Proudfit,
151 Ga. 403, 107 S. E. 327 (1921). Where seals are unnecessary, it would
seem better to disregard them entirely as surplusage. Homer v. Bca eej,
105 Md. 193, 65 Atl. 820 (1907); (1924) 24 Co. L. Rsv. 916. In general,
ratification may consist of any conduct reasonably justifying the conclusion
that the agent's act was approved, and the tendency is to apply this rule
to unnecessarily sealed instruments. Goldring v,. Reid, 61 Fla. 250, 54 So.
718 (1911); MECHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 424. Where the agent signs
at the direction and in the presence of the principal, the signature is
treated as that of the principal. Gardcncr v. Gardener, 5 Cush. 483 (Mass.
1850) ; REiNHARD, AGENCY (1902) § 57. Delivery by the principal of a deed
sealed without proper authority has been held to "adopt" the instrument.
Clough v. Clough, 73 Me. 487 (1882). In United Leather Co. v. Prodfit,
supra, the reason advanced for the decision was that if the contract were
held enforceable, the longer period of limitations would apply, which would
be unjust to the principal inasmuch as sealed authority had not been
given. As the statute was not involved in that or the instant case, it
would seem more desirable to treat the instrument as a simple contract
rather than a nullity, especially as the principal manifestly intended to
bind himself.
BALIE. T-RED.LITRaY--IDIPOSSmxLrrY AS EXCUSE.The plaintiff's car was
stolen, without any negligence on the part of the defendant, from the
latter's garage where it was being repaired. The car was later found
at a distant point. The defendant refused to take steps to recover and
redeliver the car. In an action of claim and delivery the trial court gave
judgment for defendant. Held, on appeal, that non-negligent loss by theft
is a complete excuse and subsequent police recovery of the bailed chattel
imposes no duty of redelivery on the bailee. Emigh v. Wood, 253 Pac. 947
(Calif. App. 1927).
It is generally stated that destruction or loss by theft operates to release
the bailee because of the impossibility of returning the chattel bailed. See
Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 838, (Q. B. 1863); Claflin v. Meyer,
75 N. Y. 260, 262 (1878) ; 1 HALSBURY, LAWS OP ENGLAND (1907) 553. Yet
early in the common law there was an absolute responsibility upon the
bailee. Y. B. 33 Hen. VI, f. 1, pl. 3 (1455) (warden responsible for
escape of prisoners); So.tlieote's Case, 4 Co. 83b (K. B. 101) (theft).
This is said to have been based on the theoretical possibility of a remedy
over by the bailee against the escaped prisoner or thief. See Hovuis,
THE Co-imoN LAW (1881) 175 et seq. But, at the same time, immunity
was recognized under certain circumstances. Y. B. 6 Hen. VII, f. 12, pl.
9 (1491) (bailee had no remedy because thief e'xecuted and his g03aL-
forfeited to state); Williamns v. Lloyd, Jones, W. 179 (K. B. 1620) (death
of animal bailed). And since Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Raym. Ld. 909 (K. B.
1703), immunity has been allowed in all cases of non-negligent loss, in-
cluding theft. Finucane v. Snall, 1 Esp. 315 (K. B. 1795); Maceuzie
v. Cox, 9 C. & P. 632 (Ex. 1840). Thus nothing short of impossibility
will excuse a failure to redeliver. See Sessiovs v,. Wc.ter R. R. Corp.
16 Gray, 132, 136 (Mass. 1860). And a garage keeper has been denied
the excuse of theft when he neglected immediate pursuit of a Imown
thief. Tacoma Auto Livery Co. ,v. Union Motor Car Co., S7 Wash. 102, 151
Pac. 243 (1915). The garage keeper's lien, which gives him a right to
possession good against the entire world including the bailor, Vould not
be lost by a third person's conversion. Judge v. C .ris, 72 Ark. 12, 78
S. W. 746 (1904); Phelan v,. Terry, 101 Blinn. 454, 112 N. W. 872 (1907).
Since the bailee is entitled to possession and is capable of restoring the car
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it would seem a sounder judgment to impose upon him the burden of re-
covery and redelivery. This conclusion is justified by considerations of
public policy which have been applied in the case of carriers, DODW BAIL-
MENTS (1914) 326, and innkeepers, JONES, BAILMAENTS (1806) 109, i.e.,
the prevention of fraud and collusion in the bailee.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-MARITIME LIENS IN TERRITORIAL WATERS.-Supplies
were furnished by the libellant to an American boat in the port of Boston.
The owner of the vessel resided in New York. The boat was libelled in
Canada. Under American law the libellant was entitled to a lien. The
Canadian law conferred no lien. The claimant, who purchased the vessel
without notice of the lien, contended that the law of Canada controlled
the rights of the parties. Held, that the lien be granted on the ground
that the lex loci contractus controlled the rights of the parties. The Strand-
hill, 1927 Am. Mar. Cas. 244 (Sup. Ct. of Canada).
A maritime lien is said to be a right of property, The Lottawana, 88
U. S. 558 (1874); a jus in re, The John G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113, 18 Sup,
Ct. 544 (1898); and not a mere matter of procedure. The Barge Wait-
baushene, 22 Fed. 109 (N. D. N. Y. 1884). The "nature" of the lien is
the same irrespective of whether it arises out of contractual or delictual
causes of action. Beach, Relative Priority of Maritime Liens (1924) 33
YALn LAW JOURNAL, 841, 845. Anglo-American courts confer liens arising
out of contractual claims when they are conferred at the lex loci contractus.
The Maud Carter, 29 Fed. 156 (D. Mass. 1886) (lien conferred at lex loci
contractus recognized at lex fori although no lien would have been created
had contract been made at lex fori.); The Woudrichem, 278 Fed. 568 (E.
D. N. Y. 1921) (libel dismissed at lex fori because not proven that similar
lien was created at lex loci contractus.) But ef. The Snetind, 276 Fed. 139
(D. Me. 1921), where the District Court of Maine allowed a lien although
the law of the len loci contractus was not proved; but a lien was in fact
created at the lex loci contractus. See The Kaiser Wilhelm II, 230 Fed.
717, 720 (D. N. J. 1916). An exception is made of seamen's contracts
on the ground of the intimate relationship existing between the vessel and
its crew. These are controlled by the law of the ship's flag. Cf. The City
of Norwich, 279 Fed. 687, 691 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922). The lex fori will fre-
quently exercise its discretion, The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 363, 5 Sup.
Ct. 860, 865 (1885) ; and decline to take jurisdiction over disputes between
the ship and its crew. The Belvidere, 90 Fed. 106 (S. D. Ala. 1898). With
respect to liens arising out of delictual claims the lex loci delicti is said
likewise to control. The Cuzuco, 225 Fed. 169 (W. D. Wash. 1915). But
the law of the ship's flag is looked to when a claim arises out of personal
injuries to seamen. The Hanna Nielsen, 273 Fed. 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921)
certiorari denied, 257 U. S. 653, 42 Sup. Ct. 93 (1921) (injury in Italy to
a seaman on a Norwegian vessel). Contra as to seamen by statute, when
the tort occurs in the territorial waters of the United States. Heredia v.
Davis, 12 Fed. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926). The District court of Maine
has recognized a lien although none was conferred at the lex loci delicti.
The Kongsli, 252 Fed. 267 (D. Me. 1918) (collision between two vessels
in territorial waters of Algeria). See Magruder and Grout, Wrongful
Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
395, 424. Cases have been cited as supporting the rule of The Kongsli,
supra, viz: The Kaiser Wilhelm II, supra; The Maggie Hammond, 76 U.
S. 435 (1869). (1919) 32 HARv. L. Rsv. 574. In the first case the lex
loci required certain procedural steps to be complied with before the lien
was enforceable. The decision of the lex fori recognizing the existence of
a lien was sound although the steps had not been taken, since matters re-
lating to procedure are controlled by the lex fori. Fant v. Miller, 17 Grat.
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47, 61 (Va. 1866); LORENZEN, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1924)
199, n. 19. In the second case the statements relied upon were obitcr. Since
the courts ordinarily refuse to grant rights which are not created by the lex
loci, no reason is apparent for ruling otherwise in the case of a lien, -which
in the final analysis is a right to additional security. The instant case
in recognizing the lien created by the lex loci contracthm is Eound.
CONTFA.CTS--INJUNCTION As Excuss FOR NON-PEnFORMNCE.-The de-
fendant, mortgagee of certain prendses, contracted to sell them to the plain-
tiff under a foreclosure. The mortgagor, in a suit for redemption, there-
after obtained a decree enjoining the conveyance. In the present action
for breach of contract to convey, the trial court directed a verdict for the
defendant. Held, on appeal, that judgment be entered on the verdict since
the former decree established the invalidity of the sale as to all parties
concerned. Levinsonvz'. Cambridge Sa'. Banlk, 155 N. E. 421 (Mass. 1927).
The effect of the decree in favor of the mortgagor was to hold that
the mortgagee had no power to convey the prenises. His privilege and
power to contract to convey would appear to be unaffected. It would fol-
low that the right-duty relationship asserted in the instant action has in
no way been adjudicated. Cf. Quinn v. Co:., 250 Pac. 562 (Ariz. 1926);
Lawer v. Mitts, 33 Wyo. 249, 23S Pac. 654 (1925). Situations do e:xst
where findings in an antecedent action against two parties control their
mutual legal relations in a subsequent suit between them, even though such
rights were not directly litigated. Wait v. Pierce, 210 N. W. 322 (Wis.
1926) (where joint tort-feasors were held responsible in previous action,
this determined right of one to reimbursement from other); see Pittburgh
Ry. v. Borough, 135 Atl. 227, 229, (Pa. 1926). But the instant situation
would appear to be in no way analogous. The effect of the former decree
did not disable the defendant from performing; it only made performance
more difficult, i.e., it necessitated his purchasing outstanding claims. Fail-
ure to perform is ordinarily not excused by the difficulty or expense thereof.
Whitman v. Anglum, 92 Conn. 392, 103 AtI. 114 (1913); Dalla., Co. v.
Creston Co., 161 La. 1077, 109 So. 844 (1926) ; CORBiN, CASES 0N CO.NcTM as
(1921) 917, n. 44. Contracts to sell that which one does not own are
regularly upheld. Montana Wheat Land Co. v. N. P. Ry. Co., 303 III. 620,
139 N. E. 876 (1923); Levy v. Larson, 61 Calif. App. 754, 215 Pac. 913
(1923). The instant decision would appear to be doubtful, although the
facts may not have been fully reported.
CONTRACTS-WAIVER OF TORT-STATUTE AUTHORIZING JURIsDICTIO:. OvT
NON-RESIDENT JOINTLY INDEBTED WITH RE5sDENT.-By statute judgment
could be entered against a non-resident joint debtor "upon a contract"
where jurisdiction existed over the other defendant. After a verdict against
A for conversion, judgment was entered against A and B, his non-resident
partner. Thereafter it was ruled that the statute did not apply to a debt
arising out of a cause of action in tort. On a subsequent new trial against
A, the plaintiff amended his complaint, electing to waive the tort and sue
in assumpsit. Judgment was again entered against both A and B and B's
motion to strike his name was denied. Held, on appeal, (three judges dis-
senting) that the order denying the motion be reversed since the amended
complaint did not give notice to B; without expressing an opinion as to
whether or not the statute would apply to an original action on an im-
plied contract arising out of waiver of tort. Mttrcdge v. G'annis, 244 N.
Y. 182, 155 N. E. 93 (1926).
In waiver of tort cases the fiction of an assumpsit gives rise to difficulty
in deternining the applicability of statutes referring specifically to con-
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tract or tort claims. The Court of Claims has refused to construe such
an action as "a contract express or implied" within the meaning of the
legislative enactment conferring jurisdiction. Bigby v. United States,
188 U. S. 400, 23 Sup. Ct. 468 (1903); Curved Electrotype Plate Co. v.
United States, 50 Ct. Cl. 258 (1915). On the other hand, there is a clear
tendency to abrogate the common law rule that actio personalis moritur
cure persona by construing suits in assumpsit as contract cases. Bates v.
Dresser, 229 Fed. 772 (D. Mass. 1915).; Columbia Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons,
96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1924); Bank of Grottoes v. Brown 8 Fed. (2d)
321 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925). As to the inclusiveness of the term "contract" as
used in statutes of limitations, providing a longer period for the bringing
of contract than of tort actions, there is a division of opinion. Some courts,
in their effort to strictly enforce the policy of limitations, apply the shorter
period. Handtoffski v. Chicago Traction Co., 274 Ill. 282, 113 N. E. 620
(1916); see Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit (1910) 19 YA=&
LAw JounNAL, 221, 236. Others seem ready to construe it liberally in
order to give a remedy more freely. Matthys v. Donelson, 179 Iowa, 1111,
160 N. W. 944 (1917); Lipman Wolfe Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd.,
258 Fed. 544 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919); Foster and Glassell Co. Ltd. v. Knight
Bros., 152 La. 595, 93 So. 913 (1922). Since definitions of "contract" vary,
liberality of construction is desirable if the policy underlying the statute
is one that deserves a wide application. Such seems to be the tendency
in construing statutes permitting set-offs and counterclaims. See Corbin,
op. cit. supra at 239. There may well be varying opinions as to the desir-
ability of extending the rule of the instant statute. It is to be regretted
that the question was not squarely met.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EMINENT DOMAIN-PUBLIC UsE.-A statute au-
thorized a chautauqua corporation to condemn certain land, which it pro-
ceeded to do. The defendant-landowner objected to the constitutionality
of the statute. The plaintiff excepted to a ruling sustaining the defendant's
objections. Held, on appeal, that the exceptions be overruled on the ground,
inter alia, that since the statute authorized the condemnation of property
for other than a public use it was unconstitutional. Fountain Park Co.
v. Hensler, 155 N. E. 465 (Ind. 1927).
A striking conflict exists as to the meaning of "public use" for the
purpose of eminent domain where the proceedings are not instituted for
purely governmental purposes or those incident to the operation of public
utilities. LmvIs, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) § 257 et seq.; COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 1124 et seq. Condemnation of
a right of way to permit the development of privately owned mines has been
permitted. Strickley v. Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 26 Sup. Ct. 301 (1906);
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Mines, 53 Utah, 413, 174 Pac. 172 (1918).
Contra: Inspiration Copper Co. v. New Keystone Copper Co., 16 Ariz. 257,
144 Pac. 277 (1914). And to reach inaccessible timber-lands. Mountain
Timber Co. v. Court, 77 Wash. 585, 137 Pac. 994 (1914). Contra: Ander-
son v. Logging Co., 71 Or. 276, 139 Pac. 736 (1914). And to provide
railroad facilities to a remotely situated factory. Armstrong v. Illinois
Cent. Ry., 282 S. W. 382 (Tenn. 1926); Cottrell v. Chicago Ry., 192 Ind.
692, 138 N. E. 504 (1923). Contra: Limits Industrial Co. v. Pipe Works,
321 Ill. 101, 151 N. E. 567 (1926). And to connect a private farm with
a highway. Komposh v. Powers, 75 Mont. 493, 244 Pac. 298 (1926). Con-
tra: Kingston v. Anderson, 300 111. 577, 133 N. E. 347 (1921) ; Edwards v.
Myers, 99 Ohio, 96, 124 N. E. 128 (1918). Such action is also permitted to
allow the construction of irrigation ditches for the improvement of private
lands. Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361, 25 Sup. Ct. 676 (1905); Andersen v.
Court, 119 Wash. 406, 205 Pac. 1051 (1922). Contra: Smith v. CaMeron,
106 Or. 1, 210 Pac. 716 (1922). But a private college has been refused
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the power of eminent domain. Connccticztt College v. Calrvct, 87 Conn.
421, 88 AtI. 633 (1913). Likewise a private cemetery association. Evcr-
green Cemzetery Ass'n v. Beech er, 53 Conn. 551, 5 At]. 353 (1886). A syn-
thesis of these cases would seem to indicate that the power of condemnation
in private organizations is largely limited to those situations where the
economic development of the community would seem to require its exercise.
Where a governmental agency institutes the proceedingz, however, "public
use" has been much more liberally construed. Thus land may be con-
demned for the purpose of establishing or protecting scenic beauty.
Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700, 43 Sup. Ct. 689 (1923); A an-
sas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404 (1923); Attorney-Gcn'l v.
Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77 (1899). Contra: Fai t Steel Co.
v. Bridgeport, 60 Conn. 278, 22 Atl. 561 (1S91). The conflicting dcisions
cannot be reconciled. Where "public use" is construed in the light of a
subjective concept of public policy, variations in geopraphical, economic
and social conditions in the several jurisdictions are responsible for con-
flicting results in a given situation. But of. Swith v. Cameron, ipra, at
17, 19, 210 Pac. at 721, 722. The instant case by treating chautauqua activi-
ties as a non-public use lends support to the distinctions above stated, there
being no significant economic considerations involved.
CORPORATIONS-SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHT OF PRm-,IFTo i; Tm sisLny
SHAREs.-The plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all the other common
voting shareholders, sued to enjoin the defendant corporation from sell-
ing at a public sale on sealed bids common voting shares which it had re-
acquired sixteen years before in taking over the assets of the company
to which they had originally been issued. The lower court denied the
injunction on the ground that shareholders have no pre-emptive right to buy
treasury shares. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. Borg
v. Intl Silver Co., 11 Fed. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
The prior right of shareholders to subscribe, in proportion to their exist-
ing holdings, for new shares, i.e., an increase in the originally authorized
capital stock, is well settled. 1 CooK, CoRrowTioNs (Sth ed. 1923) § 286. It
is recognized in order that each shareholder may preserve his relative
voice in the management of the corporation, and his proportionate interest
in its assets. (1907) 20 HsARV. L. REV. 398. The latter ground would
seem not to obtain if corporations are precluded from creating additional
,hares at less than their reasonable sale value. The pre-emptive right
extends to bonds convertible into shares, and perhaps to fractional sharez.
Wall v. Utah Copper Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 17, 62 AtI. 533 (1905); see Coon.
loc. cit. svpra. Normally a shareholder can enjoin a threatened violation of
his pre-emptive right. Snelling v. Richar.ds, 166 Fed. 6Q3 (S. D. N. Y., 1909).
But an injunction to restrain the creation of common voting shares in e:,-
change for property of peculiar nature, not otherwise procurable, has b2cn
denied; although the right of the complaining shareholder to damages
caused thereby was recognized in the same case. lls redith v. NIcz, Jerwp,
Zinc Co., 55 N. J. Eq. 211, 37 Atl. 539 (1897) (adjacent mines); see Bon-
net v. First Nat'l Bank, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 613, 616, 60 S. W. 325, '2
(1900); Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 285, 299, 78 N. E.
1090, 1094 (1906). For the same reasons that apply to an issue of ncv:
shares, it is now held that shareholders also have a pre-emptive right in un-
issued shares, i.e., those originally authorized but untaken for a considerable
period. Snelling v. Richard, supra; Gklen v. Kittanning Brewing Co., 259 Pa.
510, 103 At. 340 (1918) (10 years); Titvq v. Paul State Banh, 32 Idaho, 23,
179 Pac. 514 (1919) ; Upton v. South. Produce Co., 133 S. E. 576 (Va. 1926)
(3 years). Contra: Curry v. Scott, 54 Pa. 270 (1867) (7 yearz); Archcr v.
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Hesse, 164 App. Div. 493, 150 N. Y. Supp. 296 (1st Dept. 1914). Such a rule
affords the courts another ground besides that of fraud for enjoining, or
declaring invalid, an issue of such shares by the directors to themselves
to perpetuate their control. Humboldt Park Ass'n v. Stevens, 34 Neb. 528,
52 N. W. 568 (1892); Luther v. Luther Co., 118 Wis. 112, 94 N. W. 69
(1903). But in regard to treasury shares, i.e., those which have been issued
and reacquired by the corporation, the right of pre-emption has been denied
as unnecessary on the ground that the shareholder's proportionate interest
is determined by the original issue, and is -not affected by reissue. Hart-
ridge v. Rockwell, R. M. Charlt. 260 (Ga. 1828); State v. Smith, 48 Vt.
266 (1876); Crosby v. Stratton, 17 Colo. App. 212, 68 Pac. 130 (1902).
Contra: Dunn v. Acme Auto Co., 168 Wis. 128, 169 N. W. 297 (1918). But
this reasoning is not altogether satisfactory. Both at common law and
by statute, treasury shares cannot be voted. O'Connor v. Int'l Silver Co.,
68 N. J. Eq. 67, 59 Atl. 321 (1904). Nor can they be assessed or participate
in dividends. See Tulare Irigation Dist. v. Kaweah Canal Co., 5 Calif.
Unrep. 330, 332, 44 Pac. 662, 663 (1896). And an accounting between share-
holders would proceed on the basis of their proportion of the shares still
outstanding, regardless of treasury shares. Gustin v. Merrill, 144 Mich.
498, 108 N. W. 408 (1906). Hence it seems that by reacquiring its own
shares, a corporation gets nothing but a power to issue others in their
place, and the consequent reduction of the total outstanding shares increases
the proportionate interest of each shareholder. Where, as in the instant
case, the power of reissue remains unexercised for a considerable period,
it seems, as where authorized shares remain untaken, that the shareholders
become entitled to have their existing relative status maintained. Hence
a pre-emptive right in treasury shares, not expeditiously reissued, should
be recognized.
DAMAGES-UNLIQUIDATED CLAIMS-INTEREST AS A FACTOR IN REcoVERY
ON IMPLIED CONTRACT.-Plaintiff sued for the value of his services as at-
torney for defendant, and claimed interest from the date of demand. From
a denial of this claim, plaintiff appealed. Held, that interest be awarded
since under the facts of this case it is necessary for "just compensation."
Prager v. New Jersey Fidelity Co., 245 N. Y. 1 (1927).
The orthodox rule is that interest as a concomitant of damages is re-
coverable only on liquidated demands. 1 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912)
§ 299. Where the suit is on a quantum meruit basis, the claim is sometimes
called "unliquidated." Haun v. Rosenmayer, 46 Calif. App. 353, 189 Pac.
117 (1920); Carter v. Bartholomew Road Improvement Dist., 156 Ark. 413,
246 S. W. 487 (1923); but cf. Pearson v. Ryan, 42 R. I. 83, 105 Atl.
513 (1919) (dispute merely as to amount due is no bar to allowing interest).
In New York, the rule is established allowing recovery on an unliquidated
claim where the amount due may be reduced to certainty by computation
or the use of established market values. Sweeney v. City of New York, 173
N. Y. 414, 66 N. E. 101 (1903) (computation on basis of earlier services);
ef. Faber v. City of New York, 222 N. Y. 255, 118 N. E. 609 (1918) (where
contractor had to do extra work because of condition of soil, interest not
allowed because there was no recognized standard by which to measure
the value of his services). Connecticut has repudiated distinctions between
liquidated and unliquidated claims as a basis for allowing interest. Bern-
hard v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 79 Conn. 388, 65 Atl. 134 (1906);
Stoddard v. Sagal, 86 Conn. 346, 85 Atl. 519 (1912). This is justified as
an indemnity to one who has been denied the use of the sum ultimately
recovered. General Supply and Construction Co. v. Goelet, 241 N. Y. 28,
148 N. E. 778 (1925); Olson v. Shuler, 210 N. W. 453 (Iowa 1926); see
SEDGWICK, op. cit. supra § 300. It is sometimes not applied if so full a re-
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covery seems inequitable. See Metcalf Co. Ltd. v. Maycr, 213 App. Div.
607, 211 N. Y. Supp. 53 (1st. Dept. 1925) (no interest allowed where claim
illegally included items for which plaintiff was not entitled to recover). But
such a limitation is unjustified if it is admitted that the amount of the re-
covery was a debt antecedently owing by the defendant and that interest is
an indemnity for the denial of the privilege of using that sum. The instant
case is approved as tending further to eliminate the distinction between
liquidated and unliquidated claims in New York.
EQUITY-REFORIATION OF INSTRUmENTs-MisTAKE--Pn voUs Ar.=-
DiEN-r.-The plaintiff filled out an itemized bid for a building contract.
The defendant, a municipal corporation, notified the bidders of an over-
statement in one of the items. The plaintiff subtracted the money amount
of the overstatement from the grand total of his tendered bid. The con-
tract was required by statute to be under seal. The defendant, in accept-
ing the bid, further substracted the same amount from the special item
bid. The plaintiff seeks to have the "contract rectified to give effect to
. . . the common intention of the parties when the contract was drawn
up." Held, that judgment be given for the defendant because the mistake
was unilateral; and even had the mistake been mutual, since the statute re-
quired contracts of municipal corporations to be under seal, there was no
previous "contract" to which the instrument could be reformed. Higgins v.
Nothanpton Corporation, 136 L. T. 235 (Ch. 1926).
It is generally said that mutual mistake is ground for reformation of
a written instrument, but unilateral mistake alone is not. 2 Pounoy,
EQurr4.BLE REIEDMIES (1905) §§ 675, 676; see (1924) 24 Co. L. Rav. 423.
But reformation is allowed in the case of "unilateral mistake" in conjunc-
tion with fraud or inequitable conduct of the other party. Mocldenpal. t.
Mayhew, 138 Wis. 561, 119 N. W. 826 (1909) (defendant knew of plaintiff's
mistake). "Mutual mistake" has been liberally construed to allow refor-
mation under pressure of circumstances similar to those in the instant
case. Neill v. Midland R. R., 20 L. T. (N.s.) 864 (1869) ; Hygice Fibre Co.,
v. United States, 59 Ct. Cl. 598 (1924) (executed contract, plaintiffs gross
mistake in bid innocently accepted by defendant, held "mutual mistake");
Fort v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 102 Misc. 584, 169 N. Y. Supp. 229
(Sup. Ct. 1918); cf. Board v. Bender, 36 Ind. App. 164, 72 N. E. 154 (1904)
(recission allowed where plaintiff made mistake in bid because "hurried"
by defendant); Dzuris v. Pierce, 216 Mass. 132, 103 N. E. 296 (1913) (rescis-
sion allowed where plaintiff's mistake induced by defendant's mistake).
Reformation is denied when some expression of mutual assent to the writ-
ten instrument is totally lacking. Fitzgerald v. Arcadc Theatre Co., 153
N. Y. Supp. 618 (Sup. Ct. 1915) ; Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Hilliard,
65 Fla. 443, 62 So. 585 (1913). But an instrument will be rectified to con-
form with an oral agreement unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
Johnson v. Bragge [1901] 1 Ch. 28; Baird v. Eric R. R., 148 App. Div. 452,
132 N. Y. Supp. 971 (4th Dept. 1911); Hickman v. Cave, 115 Kan. 701, 224
Pac. 57 (1924). Contra: Glass v. Hulbcrt, 102 Mass. 24 (1869). See (1923)
32 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 624. Where contracts of municipal corporations
are subjected to statutory requirements similar to those in the instant case,
the American courts have reached the same result as in the Statute of
Fraud cases. McManus v. Philadelphia, 211 Pa. 394, 60 Atl. 1001 (1903) ;
Bronk v. Standard Mfg. Co., 141 Mich. 680, 105 N. W. 33 (1905); Collins
v. Keokuk, 147 Iowa, 233, 124 N. W. 601 (1910); Carey v. Saginaw, 79
Mich. 73, 44 N. W. 168 (1889); 2 DILLON, MuN CIPAL CORPS. (5th ed. 1911)
§ 780. This would appear to be the more desirable rule i.e,, to give to the
subsequent sealed instrument the effect of creating those legal relations
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which the antecedent agreement would have created save for the statute.
The instant case is in accord with the English precedent. Faraday v. Tam-
worth Union, 81 J. P. 81 (1917); Young v. Mayor etc. of Leamington Spa,
8 App. Cas. 519 (1883). But such a construction of the statute tends towards
undue formalism.
EVIDENcE-ADmtIssILITY OF BOOK ENTRIES.-The plaintiff's right to in-
herit from her father depended on her legitimacy. To prove that she was
illegitimate the defendant offered a book entitled "Register Warwick
Farm", which contained entries in chronological order from 1846 to 1896.
The matron of the Warwick poor farm produced the book and testified
that four years before the trial she found the book in a desk in the office.
The lower court allowed the book in evidence. Held, on appeal, that ad-
mitting the book was error since there was no evidence to show the identity
of the entrant or his source of knowledge, or that the entries were made
pursuant to a duty, and because the entry, relevant to the case, was not
made contemporaneously with the facts recorded. Budlong v. Budlong, 136
Atl. 308 (R. I. 1927).
Generally, entries are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if
there is (1) some necessity and (2) a guarantee of trustworthiness. 3 Wia-
MORE, EVMENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 1521-1522. The necessity is furnished by
the unavailability of the person who could testify to the facts set out in the
entry. Ibid. § 1521. The reason for the unavailability should be immaterial.
North Bk. v. Abbot, 13 Pick. 465 (Mass. 1833). Not only are death, in-
sanity, and absence from the jurisdiction held to be sufficient reasons, but
also business convenience. State v. Wagner, 279 S. W. 23 (Mo. 1926). To
furnish the guarantee of trustworthiness some courts hold that the entry
must have been made pursuant to a "duty." Currie v. Davis, 130 S. C. 408,
126 S. E. 119 (1923). Other courts more progressively hold that it is suffi-
cient if the entries are made in the regular course of business. Dillon v,.
Heller, 99 N. J. L. 68, 122 Atl. 595 (1923); 3 WIGMORE, op. elt. e p,'a
§ 1524. It is also held that the entry must have been made contempor-
aneously with the occurrence of the fact. In re Greenwood, 201 Mo. App,
39, 208 S. W. 635 (1919). But the facts of each case should control and
the trial judge should have a wide discretion. Barker v. Haskell, 9 Cush.
218 (Mass. 1852). It would seem more desirable to admit the evidence
for what it is worth, although not made contemporaneously with the fact.
Utah C. & S. Bank v. Fox, 44 Utah, 323, 140 Pac. 660 (1914). According
to the earlier cases, another requirement was that the entrant had to
testify that the entry was made in the regular course of business and
was correct. Herriott v. Kersey, 69 Iowa, 111, 18 N. W. 468 (1886). Many
courts, however, hold it sufficient if the person who supervised the keeping
of the books so testifies. White S. M. Co. v. Gilmore F. Co., 128 Va. 630,
105 S. E. 134 (1920) ; Joy v. Fakes F. & C. Co., 286 S. W. 611 (Tex. 1926) ;
State v. Roach, 131 Atl. 606 (N. H. 1926). See People v. Small, 150 N. E.
435, 451 (Ill. 1925). Some courts have with much reason held it sufficient
if the book was identified and produced by a person who had access to
same. French v. Virginia Ry., 121 Va. 383, 93 S. E. 585 (1917) (train
dispatchers reports introduced by a claim adjuster); Flowers -v. Spears,
190 N. C. 747, 130 S. E. 710 (1925) (books of branch bank introduced by
cashier of parent bank); Redmond v. United States, 8 Fed. (2d) 24 (C. C.
A. 1st., 1925) (book of a corporation introduced by its president who knew
that it was one of the corporation books but had never seen it). See State
v. Wagner, supra at 27. In accord with these tendencies, under the facts
of the instant case, the question of admissibility might well have been left
to the discretion of the trial court. The decision of the instant court may
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be explained both by the abundance of supporting authority and by the fact
that the purpose of the evidence was to prove illegitimacy.
EvDENcE-AmissmILrY OF INCOmPE:TENT EviDENce In JUmENME Coras.-
The defendant, a boy 15 years of age, was arrested and tried on a charge
of delinquency, involving burglary and larceny. He was convicted in the
Children's Court of Buffalo on the uncorroborated testimony of an alleged
accomplice and a confession procured by threats of violence. Held, on ap-
peal, that the conviction be reversed since the nature of the act of delin-
quency being criminal, the evidence upon which the conviction was based
was incompetent as being an involuntary confession and hearsay. Pcople
v. Fitzgerald, 244 N. Y. 307, 155 N. E. 584 (1927).
The function of juvenile courts is said to be not to punish, but to
aid and benefit the child through corrective measures. Ez parte King,
141 Ark. 213, 217 S. W. 465 (1919); Hills v. Picree, 113 Or. 386, 231 Pac.
652 (1924). The proceedings are not considered criminal in nature. In
re Broaghtoi2, 192 Mich. 418, 158 N. W. 84 (1916) ; State v. Be.cmcr, 'Q00
Mo. 359, 254 S. W. 179 (1923). Contra: Millcr v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. App.
495, 200 S. W. 389 (1918). Hence it is usually held that the child is not
deprived of due process of law by the denial of a trial by jury. State v.
Bckder, supra; Commonealth v. Canics, 82 Pa. Super. Ct. .35 (1023).
But the juvenile courts have tended, as in the instant case, to conform
closely to the jury-trial rules of evidence, although, as summary bzodiez,
they have modified the rules of civil procedure. State v. Zirbed, 171 WVis.
493, 177 N. W. 601 (1920); In re Hill, 247 Pac. 591 (Calif. 1926). Other
types of administrative bodies have varied greatly in their application of
the rules of evidence. Wigmore, Administrative Boards and Comwr'sions:
Are the jzry-trial rules of evidence in force for their inquiries? (1922) 17
ILL. L. REv. 263. In workmen's compensation cases, it is generally held that
while an award will not be set aside for the admission of incompetent evi-
dence such as hearsay, there must be other competent evidence upon which
to sustain the award. Park City v. Indzustrial Commission, 63 Utah, 205,
224 Pac. 655 (1924); Lloyd-McAlpize Logging Co. v. WIdtefich, 206 N. W.
914 (Wis. 1926). This rule varies under different statutes. Cf. Carroll
v. K-Ickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916); State
Compensation Ins. Fuzd v. Indzstrial Accident Comm., 195 Calif. 174, 231
Pac. 996 (1924); Merritt v. Ind2,strial Comm., 152 N. E. 505 (II. 1926).
By reason of the nature of the commission it should be allowed to make
its own rules permitting hearsay and other evidence which it desnms rca-on-
ably probative and relevant. (1922) 36 HARv. L. REV. 79. The same rule
should apply to juvenile courts, where the rigidity of the rules of evidence
might well be relaxed to permit judges to estimate, from their experience
and from the circumstances of the case, the desirability or necessity of
aiding the child by commitment to a reform school. BmGGS, REFonrMWORnY
REFORM (1924) 197. It would seem that the aforementioned purpose of
the juvenile courts could be better served by allowing the juvenile judge to
use or reject at his discretion all evidence, whether or not technically
competent. Cf. Commonwealth v. Carnes, supra.
EVIDExcE--"Dn.AD MAN" STATUTE--PLAINTIFF-PROMIS.E OF I O ;r-
BENEFICIARY CONTRACT RENDERED INCOMPETENT.-In a suit for specific per-
formance brought by the promisee of a third party beneficiary contract
against the administrator of the deceased promisor, the plaintiff was per-
mitted to testify as to the terms of the alleged agreement. On appeal from
judgment for plaintiff, held, that, although the promisee of a donce-benefici-
ary contract may compel specific performance, judgment be reverzed since
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the plaintiff was disqualified under the "Dead Man" statute as he would be
responsible for costs in the event of an adverse judgment. Whether or not
the promisee would be disqualified in a suit by the beneficiary is not decided.
Croker v. New York Trust Co., 245 N. Y. 17, 156 N. E. 81 (1927).
The beneficiary of a donee-beneficiary contract has a right of action in
New York. Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 (1918). It
has also been held there that the promisee of such a contract has no action at
law even for nominal damages. Evans v. Supreme Council, 223 N. Y. 497,
120 N. E. 93 (1918). The dictum in the instant case which, would allow
such a party specific performance is generally favored by commentators. 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 358, 359; Corbin, Contracts For the Benefit
of a Third Person (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1008, 1023. Thus the per-
son who was responsible for the creation of the beneficiary's right is enabled
to bring the transaction to its completion. There were many early cases
which treated persons responsible for costs as "parties in interest." Cent-
ury Digest (1896) Witnesses, §§ 395, 396. There are but few such cases in
the later digests. Decennial Digests and Key Number Series, Witnesses §
101. And some recent cases have permitted such witnesses to testify,
apparently "overlooking" this point without discussion. Zollicoffer v. Zolli-
coffer, 168 N. C. 326, 84 S. E. 349 (1915); Johnson v. Johnson, 105 Md. 81,
65 AtI. 918 (1907). The "Dead Man" statutes in some jurisdiction expressly
except from disqualification persons similarly situated. Wash. Comp. Stat.
(Remington, 1922) § 1211. Equity, moreover, has refused to disqualify on
such grounds because of the discretionary basis of the costs. Etheridge W.
Partain, 10 Rich. Eq. 207 (S. C. 1859). The instant opinion indicates a
further ground for disqualification in that the witness was a "person from,
through, or under whom" the beneficiary would take. Although the New
York cases are in conflict on this point, other states hold such a witness
competent. Jackson v. Gallagher, 128 Ga. 321, 57 S. E. 750 (1907). But
differences in statutes make extra-state precedents of slight value. Since
it is difficult to consider the beneficiary as a person "suceeding him [the
promisee] in title or interest", the cases permitting the promisee to testify
may perhaps be justified even technically. It would seem that whether or
not the plaintiff in such cases will be declared to be competent depends
upon the attitude of the court to "Dead Man" statutes. These enactments
have recently been subjected to much criticism. 1 WIGMORE, EVmENCE (2d
ed. 1923) § 578; (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 576; (1920) 6 IOwA L. BULL.
61. Furthermore, surveys in states where these statutes have been abro-
gated justify this criticism. MORGAN AND OTHERS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
(1927) 23 et seq., 69 et seq. Such strict holdings can be justified only on
the theory that they may stimulate the complete repeal of these statutes.
PERSoNS--DIVORCE--ADULTERY AS GROUNDS.-On a petition for divorce
filed by the wife on the ground of desertion, the husband cross-petitioned
charging adultery. The husband at the time of the marriage knew that his
wife had been incontinent. He kept the marriage secret and compelled his
wife to live apart from him as a single woman because of fear that his
parents would cast him aside financially. Held, that the counterclaim be
dismissed since the husband failed to discharge obligations incident to his
status as a husband. Pike v. Pike, 136 Atl. 421 (N. J. Eq. 1927).
That a special responsibility exists on the part of a husband when he is
aware of his wife's former incontinence or other weakness is generally
recognized. Hedden v. Hedden, 21 N. J. Eq. 61 (1870); Donahue v.
Donahue, 159 Mo. App. 610, 141 S. W. 465 (1911) ; Moss v. Moss, 24 N. C.
55 (1841) ; 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1881) § 21. But see Mattison
v. Mattison, 60 Misc. 573, 575, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1024, 1026 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
Notwithstanding that the parties live apart through agreement or because
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of desertion, adultery is nevertheless a ground for divorce. Elltt V. Ellett,
157 N. C. 161, 72 S. E. 861 (1911); Dilatush v. Dilatush, 8G N. J. Eq. 346,
98 AtI. 255 (1916); KEUzEa, lARMrcs AND Divonsc (2d ed. 1923) § 223.
Where the complainant connives in the alleged adultery he is precluded.
Shilman v. Shilman, 105 Misc. 461, 174 N. Y. Supp. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1918);
Hammond v. Hammond, 240 Mass. 182, 132 N. E. 724 (1921). Moreover
when the husband knows that his wife is about to commit adultery and
makes no objection, such manifestation of willingnss, often termed
"implied" or "passive" connivance, is a bar. KEuzER op. cit. anpra § 229;
Leavitt v. Leavitt, 229 MIass. 196, 118 N. E. 262 (1918). The instant case
in effect would appear to extend this category to a situation where the
husband should reasonably know that such an offense might be committed.
In doing so, the court established a desirable standard of marital relation-
ship. Standish v. Standish, 136 Atl. 489 (R. I. 1927).
REAL PROPERTY-COVENANT TO INSURE CONSTRUED AS COVENANT TO
PAY RENT.-The plaintiff's assignor leased one floor in his building to the
defendant's assignor and the latter agreed to pay any additional insurance
premiums on the entire building or on the stock of the plaintiff stored
therein, which might be caused by the use to which he put the floor. The
lessor was privileged to pay such premiums and add this amount to the
monthly rent. In a summary proceeding brought to evict the defendant
for his refusal to pay such sums, the trial court dismissed the petition.
Held, on appeal, that an order in favor of the petitioner be granted because
the duty to pay such sums was a covenant to pay rent. St. Regis Re, tau'-
ant v. Powers, 219 App. Div. 321, 219 N. Y. Supp. 084 (1st Dept. 1927).
There is some conflict of authority as to whether convenants to insure
the premises run with the land. Where the lessee is under a duty to re-
build they are held real. Vernon r,. Smith, 5 Barn. & Ald. 1 (K. B. 1821);
Northern Trnst Co. v. Snydtc, 76 Fed. 34 (C. C. A. 7th, IS96). Some
courts regard a duty to pay money as collateral. Undcrzvood v. Winslow,
234 Mlass. 550, 125 N. E. 631 (1920); Kaplan a'. Wildcriaaz, 95 N. J. Eq.
463, 123 Atl. 165 (1924). But a money payment relieving the lessor of a
burden incident to owning the reversion should run. Mason v. Smith, 131
Mass. 510 (1881) (taxes); Martyn v. Williams, 1 Hurl. & Norm. 817 (Ex.
1857). In the instant case, as the covenant restricts the lessee's privilege
of user of the premises, the burden should run. Driving Club -e. Fair As'n,
103 Tem. 24, 122 S. W. 254 (1909) ; Clark, Doctrine of Privity of Estate in
Connection with Real Covenants (1922) 32 YA= LAW JoUnNAL, 123. And
the benefit should also pass since the covenant operates to indemnify the
covenantee against an obligation which would fall on him as owner of the
building and hence is not "personal." Ibid.; Bigelow, Contents of Covenant.-
in Leases (1914) 30 L. Q. RM. 319. Moreover, the beneficial user of the
building by the owner, involves his keeping chattels therein. Therefore the
insurance covenant as to such chattels likewise indemnified the lez7or as
owner of the building, i. e., it protects his profitable user. Cf. Chapiuan v.
Smith, [1907] 2 Ch. 97; (1907) 7 COL. L. REV. 027. Although the insurance
is on the whole building and the benefit also affects the lessor as owner of
premises not demised, it should run with those premises. Thnston a. Minkle,
32 Mld. 487 (1870); Northern, Paific Ry. v. McClure, 9 N. D. 73, 81 N.
W. 52 (1899). The entire covenant should, then, pass to a successor to the
lessor's interest in the whole building. Manchestcr Brcu'cry Co. v. Conaubq,
[1901] 2 Ch. 608. Every lessee covenant is, to some extent, consideration
for the lease, but in the absence of clear intent the court should not treat
it as one to pay rent. Holder v,. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 34 Ga. App. 60,
128 S. E. 220 (1925) ; 1 TIFF.NY, L.4.NDLORD AN.,D TENANT (1912) § 109 (h).
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The result in the instant case seems desirable, but it is unfortunate that
the court treated it as a covenant to pay rent without affording any test as
to what kind of covenants would be so construed.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-DEFENDANT'S ADmISSION OF ORAL PRO1MISE BARS
DEFENSE.-The plaintiff, vendee, in a suit against the vendor for specific
performance of a contract to convey land, joined the defendant, the mortga-
gee of the land, in the same suit and sought to enforce the defendant's oral
promise to release his mortage in consideration of a specified payment.
The defendant in his pleadings denied the oral agreement, but admitted it
in open court. Held, that "the Statute of Frauds should not be a bar to
compelling one to carry out an honest agreement into which he had entered
with another and which he admits having made." Degheri v. Carobine,
135 Atl. 518 (N. J. Eq. 1927).
Generally, the Statute of Frauds must be pleaded specially. Matthews v.
Matthews, 154 N. Y. 288, 48 N. E. 531 (1897) ; Smith v. Pritchett, 98 Ala.
649, 13 So. 569 (1893) (by statute). Contra: Ziegener v. Daeche, 91 N. J,
L. 634, 103 Atl. 82 (1918) ; Cooley v. Hatch, 91 Vt. 128, 99 Atl. 784 (1917)
(general denial sufficient). But in some jurisdictions a declaration showing
the statute unsatisfied is demurrable. Posten v. Clem, 201 Ala. 529, 78 So.
883 (1918). And a general denial, as in the instant case, prevents proof
of an oral agreement. Baird Investment Co. v. Harris, 209 Fed. 291 (C. C. A.
8th, 1913) ; Owen v. Riddle, 81 N. J. L. 546, 79 Atl. 886 (1911). A memoran-
dum not in existence prior to bringing the action will not sustain that action.
Lucas v. Dixon, 22 Q. B. D. 357 (1889) ; Tisdale v. Harris, 20 Pick. 9 (Mass.
1838). But see Osterweil v. Faldo, 113 Misc. 395, 397, 186 N. Y. Supp. 234,
235 (Mun. Ct. 1920). It was formerly held that an admission of an oral
agreement in the answer destroyed the defense of the statute. Child v.
Godolphin, 1 Dick. 39 (Ch. 1723); Smith v. Brailsford, 1 Dess. 351 (S. C.
1794) ; BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS (5th ed. 1895) 631. More recently this
rule has been limited to where the defendant admits in his answer an oral
agreement within the statute but fails to plead the statute. Blagy v. Van
Sickle, 90 W. Va. 351, 110 S. E. 816 (1922) ; Douma v. Powers, 92 N. J. Eq.
25, 111 Atl. 401 (1920). But if pleaded, the statute is a good defense in spite
of the admission. Barrett v. McAllister, 33 W. Va. 738, 11 S. E. 220 (1890) ;
Vanduyne v. Vreeland, 12 N. J. Eq. 142 (1858); STORY, EQUITY PLEADING
(8th ed. 1870) 636. But see Wallace v. Dowling, 86 S. C. 307, 310, 68 S. E.
571, 572 (1910). Nevertheless an admission of a "trust" is more likely
to bar the defense of the statute. STORY, op. cit. supra, at 637. If a written
admission does not bar the defense, a fortiori an oral admission should not,
the statute being pleaded either specially or in the form of a general denial.
But if the oral agreement were admitted in the written pleadings and
if the plaintiff could thereupon obtain a dismissal or a voluntary non-suit
and thereafter predicate a suit on such a written admission, it would
seem desirable to allow him to reach that same result without resorting to
that technique.
TORTS-FORCIBLE RECAPTION OF CHATTELS FR1I LAND OF ANOTIER.-
The defendant entered upon the plaintiff's land, carrying a shot-gun, to
demand the return of certain of his cattle wrongfully impounded. The
plaintiff thereupon used excessive force to eject him. In fact the gun was
carried as protection against the plaintiff's dog. The defendant injured
the plaintiff while defending himself. In plaintiff's action for assault and
battery, the trial court gave judgment for the defendant on a counter-
claim for injuries. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed, inter
alia, because defendant was justified in taking precautions against known
dangers. Arlowski v. Foglio, 135 Atl. 397 (Conn. 1926).
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The instant case would seem to have been well decided for the sole reason
that the plaintiff used unreasonable force in evicting the defendant. But
there would seem to be some question whether the defendant's entry was
privileged and the further question is suggested whether force may be,
used in the recaption of a chattel from another's land. Forcible recaption
of a chattel from another's possession was early prohibited in England. 2
POLLOCK AND 1BrTLAN D, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 574.
Later it was permitted. Blade v. Higgs, 11 H. L. Cas. 721 (1361). See Branz-
ton, The Forcible Recaptre of Chattels (1912) 28 L. Q. PRv. 202 271. In
America the tendency is to prohibit it, and this view is adopted in the
America Law Institute's Tentative Restateincnt of the Law of Torta No. 3,
p. 39 (1927). The use of force to the wrongful taker on his own land is
naturally still less favored. Rohr v. Riedel, 112 Kan. 110, 210 Pac. 044
(1922); Shellabarger v. Moriis, 115 Mlo. App. 566, 91 S. W. 1005 (1905);
Watson v. Rheinderknecht, 82 Blinn. 235, 84 N. W. 798 (1901) ; Barnes v.
Martin, 15 Wis. 263 (1362). Such use of force to the person of another is
generally forbidden in analogous situations. Brendlin v. Becrs, 144 App.
Div. 403, 129 N. Y. Supp. 222 (Sup. Ct. 1911) (tradesman cannot force his
way into apartment). Silrerstin v. Kohkr & Chase, 181 Colo. 51, 183 Pac.
451 (1919) (conditional vendor cannot use force to retahe goods from
defaulting vendee); Ryerson v. Carter, 93 N. J. L. 477, 105 Atl. 723 (1919)
(gas company cannot forcibly remove gas meter). Contra: Williao.-s v.
Lubbering, 73 N. J. L. 317 (1906) (tradesman permitted to use force to
consummate privileged entry of apartment). The use of force to the perzon
in the recaption of chattels both on his own land and elsewhere, should ba
limited to those cases where the taking and recaption may be regarded as
one continuous transaction. Although the defendant made his entry for
the purpose only of again requesting the return of his cattle, yet his
belligerent appearance in conjunction with the repeated demands would
manifestly cause an expectation of personal violence and forceable rccap-
tion. But cf. (1927) 40 HLARV. L. REv. 1019. Inasmuch as the probable con-
sequence of such an entry is a breach of the peace, it should not be privil-
eged.
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